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No.71-834 OT 1971
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm.
Appeal ~from Arizona Ct. of App.

~~~J

Appellants, who are Navaho Indians living and working within the cans-t c.
fines of that portion of the Navaho reservation within the ~··'
of
t

t

-

Arizona, question the constitutionality of the Arizona state income tax
as

applied to them. The Arizona TC affirmed the validity of the tax

as to income derived

sole~y

from sources within the reservation and the

Ct. of App. affirmed. The Arizona Sup.Ct. denied a petition for review.
Appellants contend that the tax interferes with a longstanding

~Eii£~

federal policy mf self government and self determination for the American

""
Indian . The leading case on tribal self-government is that of Williams
v.
~·

358 U.S.217(1959) where the Court concluded that the basis for txeati

treaties between the Indians and the federal government was the "understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the
jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existedo" Appellants cite

~umer~us

~ffirmed,

cases in which the principle of tribal self-government was

included Kennerly v. montana District Cqurt, 400U.S.423(1971),

where this Court held that absent a vote by members of the Blackfoot Tribe
affirmative action by the

s~ate

of montana, the state could not assume

.

.,,

o...,.,d
~~

jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Keservation ~nder the Act of August 15, 1953.
The Navaho tribe

..

h~s

""

an effective court system, its own police system, its

own anti-poverty office, its own welfare program, which apparently are funded
part with fedreal funds and part with Navaho taxes collected by the tribal
unit. Appelants argue that the power to tax inheres in self goveDnment and
that it would be a crippling blow to Navaho self government if the power to
tax Navaho incomes were granted to

0-

t~•

~ fo.f.

•)ats.

'

Appellants second contention is that Indian relations are subject Et to
an overall policy of federal pre-emption and that states are powerless to
act in Indain affairs absent express congressional authorization.Appellants

-

...---:

cite Warfenlraa1ng Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Lomm.380 U.S.685(1965) where this
Cnurt held that Arizona could not tax the gross sales income of a trading post
a

a Nacaho reservation because a comprehensive congressional scheme had been
traders~on

set up in order to regulate

reservations.

In rejecting appellant~ contentions, the ~rizona Ct. of App. ~Ete~ stated
f(

\'

-

---

that the income tax was a personal tax which affected the individual but

E

in no way threatened tribal autonomy. It pointed out the longstanding practice
~, ~·~

)

of various levels of government levying taxes on another /without affecting the
others basic prerogatives,e.g. state tax upon federal employees and viceversa). It found no comprehensive

.2.·a

•~111i

pre-emption of the field of taxation

to make the Warrem Trading Post case applicable. ~inally it noted that state
M

tax monies of the state of Arizona were being expended for educational and

~eiia

welfare benefits within the Navaho reservation.
my own opinion is that this case represents a fairly significant conflict
between the traditonal federal interest in regulation of Indian affairs,

BE

a~~the

Indians' hopes for self government and the power of a state to tax

those residing within its borders. The minnesota Supreme Court viewed this ques-

, fion and and reached exactly the opposite conclusion from the Arizona
•

....'e

.cB.ut't ·in this c;se. One prece·d~~t, Leahy v: 5"tat~ f~easo of Okl..atJ.omalft} v.s. ttz.b J
-

"

'

---

(.1'13b

held that an income tax by the state of Oklahoma on moneys received
by a member of the Osage tribe as his share of income from mineral
resources held by the United States for the tribe was taxable by the
stateo

i~i

Much has gone on since then ) howeverpand even Leahy was a

quick summary

E~i~iE~

one

pa~e

~~i

opiniono

I am inclined on balance to believe that

d~spite

the inequities and

abuses in their past history and dealings with this country that Indians
still should be subject to states income taxation. Indians do derive
benefits from the expenditure of state tax revenues and we have
no other ethnic or ciltural group to escape the consequences of the
taxing powero I do not believe that the state tax here poses a fundamental threat to the uniqueness of Indain civilaization or to their

Ega dreams for self determinationo Still, the question seems important
and if sentiment exists elsewhere for a hearing, I would
JOIN THREE IN NOTING PROBABLE JURISDICTION
JHW

~Ei~

..
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DISCUSS

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm.
Appeal from Arizona Sup. Ct.

At an earlier conference the views of the SG were invited.

-

The SG a

a~

a has now submitted a memorandum of

~~x

which the

saiix salient points are as follows1
r. A.s
(1)- When Comgress ~wished the states to tax Indians within

a reservation, it has done so by carefully delineated legislation.
"Since Congress has passed no law authorizing

t~e

state taxation of

income earned ~ithin a reservation, the decision of the c~rt below,
upholding the authrity of the State to impose
seems incorrect on this

,.

~round

s~~~

such a tax

al~e."

(2)-"In any event the decision below is inconsistent with the
particular legal relationship that exists between Arizona an6 the
Indianso

~~~~

When Arizona was admitted to the Union it ax agreed

-

to "forever disclaim all right and title to Indian lands and that
the same shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
the Congress of the United States."
(3)-- "The question of whether and under what circumstances
a

State~ tax income earned within a reservation by Indians who

live on the reservation therefore warrants the attention of this
Court.

It's hard to get very

~hrilleda

about the concepts in

this

case, and I wish the Court did not have to take it, but in good conscience
I feel the problems are significant enoggh to recommend a
&R~~~
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The SG moves ime ~ b
J J ,,, the United States •

be allotted 15
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The question in the case is

w~ex

whether the state of Arizona had

jurisdiction m to tax the income of Indians who live
income on the Navajo reservation.
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Rosalind McClanahan, Etc.,
Appellant,
On Appeal from the Court
v.
of Appeals of Arizona,
Division One.
State Tax Commission of
Arizona.
rFebruary -, 1973]
Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case requires us once again to reconcile the plenary
power of the States over residents within their borders
with the semi-autonimous status of Indians living on
tribal reservations. In this instance, the problem arises
in the context of Arizona's efforts to impose its personal
income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire income
derives from reservation sources. Although we have repeatedly addressed the question of state taxation of reservation Indians,' the problems posed by a state income
tax are apparently of first impression in this Court. 2
The Arizona courts have held that such state taxation is
permissible. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
' Sec, e. g., Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 31!) U. S.
598 (194:-l); Childers v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 5.55 (1926); United States
v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); The Kansas indians, 72 U. S.
(5 Wall.) 732 (1867). Cf. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) .
"State courts have disagreed on the quc8tion. Compare Ghahate
v. Bttreau of Revenue, 80 N. M. 98, 451 P. 2d 1002 (1969), with
Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 2 6 Minn. 43, 174 N. \V. 2d 120
(1970). See Powless v. State Tax Commission, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 438
(1964); State Tax Commission v. Barnes, 178 N.Y. S. 2d 932 (195~).

-------
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Commission, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P. 2d 222 ( 1971).
We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 016 (1972) , and
now reverse. \Yc hold that by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State has interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the
exclusive province of the Federal Government and the
Indians themselves. The tax is therefore unlawful as
applied to reservation Indians with income derived wholly
from reservation sources.
I
Appellant is an enrolled member of the Navajo tl'ibe
who lives on that portion of the Navajo reservation located within the State of Arizona. Her complaint alleges that all her income earned during 1967 was derived
from within the Navajo reservation. Pursuant to Ariz.
Rev. Stat. ~ 43- 188 (f), $16.29 were withheld from her
·wages for that year to cover her state income tax liability. :~ At the conclusion of the tax year, appellant filed
a protest against the collection of any taxes on her income and a claim for a refund of the entire amount
withheld from her wages. When no action ''"as taken
on her claim, she instituted this action in Arizona Superior Court on behalf of herself and those similarly
situated, demanding a return of the money withheld and
a declaration that the state tax was unlawful as applied
to reservation Indians.
"Thr liabilit~· was crcatrd b~· Ariz. Rr,·. Stat. § .J.:~- 102 (a) which,
in rrJr,·ant part , pro,·idrH: "ThNr ~hall br l<',·i<'d , rollert r d . and paid
for Pach tnxnhlo yrar upon the rntirr nrt incom<' of rvN.\" r~tntr or
trust taxnblr upon thiH titlr and of c\·cr~' rc ~ idrnt of thi~ ~tatr and
upon the Pntirr net in rome of rvPry Hon-rrHidPnt whirh i~ dNi,·cd
from ~o urrr~ within thi::; Ht:tt e, tnxr~ in th r following amount ~ :mel
nt thr following ratPs upon the amount of 11rt inconw in rxrr~H of
c·rrdit::; agai n ~t nrt incomr pro,·iclr d in §§ 4:)-127 and .J.::l- 12~. " ..\p]WIIant concrdcd hrlow th:lt ~he wa~ a "rc"idrnt " within thr ml'a ning
of thr stat ute, and that qurstion, which in any rYrnt po~<' S an i~ ~ ur
or Htatr la\Y, i ~ not now before UH.

71 -~:3 4-0PI~ION
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The trial court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim, and the Ari7.ona Court of Appeals affirmed.
Citing this Court's decision in ·will·i ams v. Lee, 358 U. S.
217 ( 1950) , the Court of Appeals hold that tho test "is
not \\'hether the Ariwna state income tax infringes on
plaintiff's right as an individual :Navajo Indian, but
whether such a tax infringes on the dghts of tho Navajo
tribe of Indians to be self-governing." 14 Ariz. App., at
454. 484 P. 2d, at 223. The Court thus distinguished
cases dealing with state taxes on Indian real property on
the ground that those taxes, unlike tho personal income
tax, infringed tribal autonomy.
The Court then pointed to cases holding that state
employees could be required to pay federal income tax
and that the State had a concomitant right to tax fed-·
eral 01nployees. See H elvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S.
405 (1038); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U. S. 466 ( 1039). Reasoning by analogy from these
cases, the Court argued that Arizona's income tax on individual Navajo Indians did not "rcause] an impairment
of tho right of the Navajo tribe to be self-governing."
14 Ariz. App., at 455, 484 P. 2d. at 224.
Nor did the Court find anything in the Arizona Enabling Act. 36 Stat. 569, to prevent the State from
taxing reservation Indians. That Act. the relevant language of \vhich is duplicated in the Arizona Constitution,
disclaims state title over Indian lands and requires that
such lands shall remain "under tho absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States." But
the Arizona court, relying on this Court's decision in
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962),
hold that the Enabling Act nonetheless permitted concurrent state jurisdiction so long as tribal self-government remained intact. Since an individual income tax
did not interfere with tribal self-government, it followed
that appellant had failed to state a claim. The Arizona

71-834-0PINION
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Supreme Court denied a petition for review of this decision, and the case came here on appeal. Sec 28 U.S. C.
§ 1257 (2) .
II
It may be helpful to begin our discussion of the law
applicable to this complex area with a brief statement of
what this case does not involve. W c are not here dealing with ~t or never inhabited reservations set aside for their exclusive use or who do not
possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government. See, e. g., Organized Village of Kake Y. Egan,
369 U. S. 60 (1962); Metlakatla Indian Community v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962); Oklahoma Tax Co·mmission v.
United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). Nor are we concm·ned with exertions of state sovereignty over nonIndians who undertake activity on Indian reservations.
See, e. g., Thomas v. Gray, 169 U. S. 264 (1898); Utah
Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). Cf.
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651 (1930).
Nor, finally, is this a case where the State seeks to reach
activity undertaken by reservation Indians on nonreservation lands. See, e. g., 'The M escalaro Apache Tribe v.
Jones, post. Rather, this case involves the narrow ques- ~
tion whether the State may tax a reservation Indian for
income earned exclusiv ly on the reservation.
The prmCiples governing e reso ution o this question are not new. On the contrary, "[tlhe policy of
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control
is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." Rice v. Olson,
324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945). This policy was first articulated by this Court 140 years ago when Chief Justice
Marshall held that Indian nations were "distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to
all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only

71-834-0PINION
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acknowledged but guaranteed by the United States."·
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). It
followed from this concept of Indian reservations as sep-.
arate, although dependent nations, that state law could
have no role to plav within the reservation boundaries.
"The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community oc-·
cupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but ''"ith the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and
this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States." Worcester v.
Georgia, supra, at 561. See also United States v..
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109
U. S. 556 (1883).
Although Worcester on its facts dealt with a. State's
efforts to extend its criminal jurisdiction to reservation
lands/ the rationale of the case plainly extended to state
taxation within the reservation as well. Thus, in 'The
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867), the Court
unambiguously rejected state efforts to impose a land
tax on reservation Indians. "If the tribal organization
of the Shawnees is preserved intact, and recognized by
the political department of the government as existing,.
then they are a 'people distinct from others,' capable of
making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government
of the Union. If under the control of Congress, from
necessity there can be no divided authority." 72 U. S.,
at 755. See also The New York Indians, 72 U. S. (5
Wall.) 761 (1866).
'See also Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711 (1945); United
States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357 (1933); United States v. Ramsey,
271 U. S. 457 (1925).

7Hn-I-OPINION
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It is true, as the State asserts, that some of the later
Indian tax cases turn not on the Indian sovereignty doctrine, but on whether or not the State can be said to
have imposed a forbidden tax on a federal instrumentality. Sec, e. g., Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma,
297 U. S. 420 (1936); United States v. Rickerl, 188 U.S.
432 ( 1903). To the extent that the tax exemption rests
on federal immunity from state taxation, it may well be
inapplicable in a case such as this involving an individual
income tax." But it would vastly oversimplify the problem to say that nothing remains of the notion that reservation Indians are a separate people to whom state jurisdiction, and therefore state tax legislation, may not
extend. Thus, only a few years ago, this Court struck
clown Arizona's attempt to tax the proceeds of a trading
company doing business "·ithin the confines of the very
reservation involved in this case. See Wan·en Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U. S. 685
(1965). The tax in no way interfered with federal
land or with the National Government's proprietary interests. But it was invalidated nonetheless because "from
the very first days of our Government, the Federal Government had been permitting the Indians largely to
govern themscl ves, free from state interference." 380
U. S., at 687." As a leading text on Indian problems
'The frdrral instrunwntalit.'· clortrinc do<'~ not prohibit ~tatr
taxa I ion of indi,·idu:-tls drri,·inp; thrir incomc from frciN:tl :-<ourrc~.
Sr(' Gm1'('8 Y. Neu> York l'X rel. O'Keefe,;)()() P. S. 466 (H):l9). cr.
Leahy v. State Trensvrer of Oklahoma, 297 U. S. 420 (19:36). The
dort rinc ha!', in n n~· P\·rnt, bccn ~ha rpl~· I imitrcl with rC':-<prct to
Indinn~. Srr 01.-/ahoma Ta.v Commission , .. Uuited Slates. :)[~) F. S.
50~ ( 1943).
r. The Court lwlo\\· di,-tinguif'ilC'd TVm-re11 Trading .Post :t" limitrd to
ra"r" whrrr thr Fcd<'ral C:on'rnmC'nt ha~ prr-rmptrd ~tatr Ja\Y by
rC'g:ulatinp; Indian tradcr~ in a manner inron~i~trnl with :-;late taxation. SC'r 14 Ariz. App. , at 45.'i, 484 1'. 2d, ~~t 224. But :d though
I hr Court wa,-, no doubt , influrnced b~· the frdrr:d licrn~inp: rC'qnirc-
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summarizes the relevant law "State Jaws generally are
not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation
exrept where Congress has expressly provided that state
laws shall apply. It follows that Indians and Indian
property on an Indian reservation are not subject to statrtaxation except by virtue of express authority conferred
upon the State by act of Congress." United States Department of Interior. Federal Indian Law 845 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as Federal Indian Law).
This is not to say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine,
with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of
state law, has remained static during the 140 years since
Worcester was decided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine
has undergone considerable evolution in response to
changer\ circumstances. As noted above, the doctrine
has not been rigidly applied in cases where Indians have
left the reservation and become assimilated into the
general community. See, e. g., Oklahmna Tax Commission Y. United Slates, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). Similarly,
notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take
account of the State's legitimate interests in regulating
the affairs of non-Indians. See, e. g., New York ex ret.
Ray Y. Martin, 326 U. S. 496 (1946); Dmper v. United
States, 164 U. S. 240 (1896); Utah & Northern R. Co.
v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). This line of cases "·as
smnmarized in this Court's landmark decision in Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959): "Over the years this Court
has modified [the Worcester principle l in cases where·
mrnts, thr rra~oninp; of H'arren 'I'mdina Post cannot br ~o rr~trictrd.
Tho Court. inn1liclatrd Arizona's tax in part bcrau~o "Congrrss
lm~, sinrr thr crration of tho N:wa.io Rrscn·ation nrarlr a crntury
ago, lrft thr Indian::; on it largrl~· frC'r to run the rc~rn· ation and
its affairs without statf' control. a ]1olir~· which hns automatically
rrlirvrd Arizona of nil hurclcnf:' for r;trrying on t ho~r same responsibilitie;-;." lVarreu 'I'radina Post Co. 1·. Arizona 'I'm: Commission,.
81/]Jra, at 690.

71-834-0PINION
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essential tribal relations were not involved and where
the right of Indians would not be jeopardized. . . . Thus,
suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts have
been sanctioned . . . . And state courts have been allowed to try non-Indians "·ho committed crimes against
each other on a reservation. . . . But if the crime was
by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive. . . . Essentially, absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringes on tho right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
358 U. S., at 220.
Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction
and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.' See The
M escalaro Apache Tr,ibe v. Jones, post. The modern
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on Platonic notions of
Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable
treaties and statutes which define the limits of state
power. Compare, e. g., United States v. Kagama, 118
U. S. 375 (1886), with Kennerly v. District Court, 400
U. S. 423 (1971). 8
7
The sourne of federal authority over Indian matters has been
the subject of some confu~ion, but it i~ now generally recognized
that. the power derives from federal re~ponsibility for regulating rommcrre with Indian tribes and for treaty making. Sec U. S. Const.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Sec also Williams v. Lee, 358
U. S. 217, 219 n. 4; Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 482
(1914); Federal Indian Law 3.
s The extent of federal pre-emption and rrsidual Indian sovrrcignty
in the total absence of federal treaty obligations or legislation is
therefore now something of a moot question. Cf. Organized Village
of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 62 (1962); Federal Indian Law 846.
The question is generally of little more than t heorct irnl importance,
however, since in almost all casrs, federal treaties and statutes define
thr boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.
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The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not
because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in
this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must
be read. It must ahvays be remembered that the various
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates
that of our own Government. Indians today are American citizens. 9 They have the right to vote,10 to use
state courts/' and they receive some state services. ~
But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last century, that "The relation of the Indian tribes living
within the borders of the United States [is] an anomalous one and of a complex character. . . . They were,
and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of
the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws
of the Union or of the State within whose limits they
1

See 8 U. S. C. § 1401 (a) (2).
See, e. g., Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948).
11
Sec, e. g., Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 332 (1892).
1
~ The Court below pointed out that Arizona was expending tax
monies for education and welfare within the confines of the Navajo
reservation. See 14 Ariz. App., at 456-457, 484 P. 2d, at 225-226.
It should be noted , however, that the Federal Government defrays
80% of Arizona's ordinary social security payments to reservation
Indians, sec 25 U. S. C. § 639, and has authorized the expenditure of
more than S88 million for rehabilitation programs for Navajos and
Hopis living on re::;ervalions. See also 25 U. S. C. §§ 13, 309, 309a
(federal support for Indian education). Moreover, "Lc]onferring
rights and privileges upon these Indians cannot ::dTcct their situation,
which can only be changed by treaty, stipulation, or a voluntary
abandonment of their tribal organization." The Kamas Indiam, 72
U. S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1867).
9

10
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reside." United States
382 (1886).

Y.

Kagmna, 118 U. S. 375, 381-

III
When the relevant treaties and statutes arc read with
this tradition of sovereignty in mind, we think it clear
that Arizona has exceeded its lawful authority by attempting to tax appellant. The beginning of our analysis
must be with the treaty which the United States Government entered with the Navajo nation in 1868. The
agreement provided. in relevant part, that a prescribed
reservation would be set aside "for the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians" and that "no persons except those herein authorized to do, and except
such officers, soldiers, agents, and employes of the government, or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter
Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by
law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this article." 15 Stat. 667, 668 (1868).
The treaty nowhere explicitly states that the Navajo
were to be free from state law or exempt from state
taxes. But the document is not to be read as an ordinary contract agreed upon by parties dealing at arms
length v;ith equal bargaining positions. We have had
occasion in the past to describe the circumstances under
which the agreement was reached. "At the time this
document ·was signed the Navajos were an exiled people
forced by the United States to live crowded together on
a small piece of land on the Pecos river in eastern New
Mexico, some 300 miles cast of the area they had occupied before the coming of the white man. In return for
their promise to keep peace, this tretay 'set apart' for
'their permanent home' a portion of what had been their
native country." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217. 221
(1959).
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It is circumstances such as these which have led this
Court in interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt the general rule that "Doubtful expressions are to be resolved
in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are
wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and
good faith." Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367
( 1030). When this canon of construction is taken together with the tradition of Indian independence described above, it cannot be doubted that the reservation
of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of
the Navajo and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the
prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within
the exclusive sovereignty of tlw Navajos under general
federal supervision. It is thus unsurprising that this
Court has interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law-including state tax law-to Indians
on the Navajo reservation. Sec TV arren Trading Post
Co. v. Ar·izona Tax Commission, 380 U. S. 685. 687, 690
(196.5); Williams v. Lee, supra, at 221-222 (1950).
Moreover, since the signing of the Navajo treaty, Congress has consistently acted upon the assumption that
the States lacked jurisdiction over Navajos living on the
reservation. ~ Thus, when Arizona entered the Union,
its entry was expressly conditioned on the promise that
the State would "forever clif.'claim all right and title
to ... all lands lying within said boundaries owned or
held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title
to ·which shall have been acquired through and from the
United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until
1

1
'' "Coul!:r<'~~ hn~ ... acted con~istrntl~ · upon thr a~,;umption 1hat
thr State;; ha1·r no power to rel!:uln1r the affair~ of lndi:tns on a
rr.,;riTation. . . . Signific:wtl.1·, when Congre~s ha;; a~ked the States
to cxcrci;;r thi~ powrr it hn;; exprr~;;J.,· gmnted thrm thr juri~diction
which Worcestl'r v. Georgia had denied." Williams ,.. Lei', ;j3R U. S.
217, 220-221 (1959).
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the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been
extinguished the sarne shall be and remain subject to
the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the United States." Arizona Enabling Act, 36
Stat. 557, 560 (1910). 1 '
Nor is the Arizona Enabling Act silent on the specific
question of tax immunity. The Act expressly provides
that "nothing herein, or in the ordinance herein provided for. shall preclude the said State from taxing as
other lands and other property are taxed any lands and
other property outs1:de of an Indian reservation owned or
held by an Indian." Ibid. (emphasis added). It is true,
of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a
general rule, by clearly expressed. But we have in the
past construed language far more ambiguous than this
as providing a tax exemption for Indians. See, e. g.,
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 6 (1956), and we see
no reason to give this language an especially crabbed or
restrictive meaning.n
Indeed, Congress' intent to maintain the tax exempt
status of reservation Indians is especially clear in light
of the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 104 et seq., which provides
comprehensive federal guidance for state taxation of those
14 This languagC' is duplicated in Arizona';,; own ronNtitution.
Sec
Ariz. Canst., Art. 20, ~ 4. It is alco contained in the Enabling
Acts of New Mexico and Utah, the other States in which tho Navajo
Rrservation is located. Sre Now Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 558550; Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 10 .
'"There is nothing in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan. 369 U.S.
60 (1062), to the contrary. In Egan, we held that "'absolute' fedC'ral jurisdiction is not invariably exclu"ive jurisdiction," and that
this language in federal legislation did not preclude the cxcrci~c of
ro~idnal state authority. See 369 U. S., at 68. But that holding
came in the context of a decision concerning tho fishing rights of
nonreservation Indians. Sec 369 U. S., at 62. It did not purport
to provide guidelinrs for tho exorci e of state authority in area::; ~ot
aHido by troat.y for tho exclusive use and control of Indians.
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living within federal areas. Section 106 (a) of Title 4
grants to the States general authority to impose an income tax on residents of federal areas, but ~ 109 expressly
provides that ''Nothing in sections 105 and 106 of this
title shall be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of
any tax on or from any Indian not otherwise taxed." To
be sure, the language of the statute itself does not make
clear whether the reference to "any Indian not otherwise taxed" was intended to apply to reservation Indians
earning their income on the reservation. But the legislative history makes plain that this proviso was meant to
except reservation Indians from coverage of the Buck
Act, see S. Rep. No. 1625, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2, 4;
84 Con g. Rec. 10685 ( 1939), and this Court has so
interpreted it. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 691 n. 18 (1965). While
the Buck Act itself cannot be read as an affirmative
grant of tax exempt status to reservation Indians, it
should be obvious that Congress would not have jealously
protected the immunity of reservation Indians from state
income taxes had it thought that the States had residual
power to impose such taxes in any event. Similarly,
narrower statutes authorizing States to assert tax jurisdiction over reservations in special situations are explicable only if Congress assumed that the States lacked the
power to impose the taxes without special authorization. 16
Finally, it should be noted that Congress has now provided a method whereby States may assume jurisdiction
over reservation Indians. Title 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (a)
grants the consent of the United States to States wishing
to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over reservation
IG Sec, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 398 (rong;re~~ional authorization for
States to tax mineral production on unallot ted t riballands). Cf. 18
U. S. C. § 1161 (state liquor laws may be applicable within re~en·a
tions); 25 U. S. C. § 231 (state health and education laws may be
npplicable with in rc. ·ervation).

..
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Indians, and 25 U. S. C. § 1324 confers upon the States
the right to disregard enabling acts which limit their
authority over such Indians. But the Act expressly
provides that the State must act '\Yith the consent of
the tribe occupying the particular Indian country," 25
U. S. C. § 1322 (a). and must "appropriately amend
rits l constitution or statutes." Once again, the Act
cannot be read as expressly conferring tax immunity
upon Indians. But we cannot believe that Congress
would have required the consent of the Indians affected
and the amendment of the state constitution if the
States were free to accomplish the same goal unilaterally
by simple legislative enactment. Sec Kennerly v. D?·strict CouTt, 400 U. S. 423 ( 1971).
Arizona, of course, has neither amended its constitution to permit taxation of the Navajos nor secured the
consent of the Indians affected. Indeed, a startling
aspect of this case is that appellee apparently concedes
that. in the absence of compliance with 25 U. S. C.
§ 1322 (a), the Arizona courts can exercise neither civil
nor criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. See
1

'

"A~ pa~~rd in HJ.'j:~ , Pub. L. 2SO, 67 Stat. 58R, ddrgntrd ci,·il
:md criminal juri~diction OYer Indi:m re~erYat ion~ to rertnin Rtntrs,
nlthongh 'lot to .\rir-ona. SrC' lR lT. S.C.§ 1162: 2S U.S. C.§ 13fi0.
Thr original Art abo providC'd a me:m~ whrrrb~· ot hrr State~ roulcl
:1~~unw .iuri~dirt ion oyrr Indian re~cn·nt iom; without t hr eorw'nt of
tlrr trihr :1ffc•rt c·d. Rrr 67 Stnt. .'i90. Ho\\·r,·rr, in 1968, Cong:rr~::;
pa~~rd tlrr Indi:w Ci1·il Right~ Art whieh changrd thr prior prorrclnrr to rrqnirr thr con~rnt of tlrr Indian~ inYohwl brforr :1 State•
mrs prrmittrd to n~~unw ,imi,dirtion. Srr 25 LT. S. C. § 13:2:2 (a).
Thn~. h:1d it wi.<hrd to do ~o, .\ rizona could haYr unila teraliY Hc':'Uillf'd
juri-<diction o1·rr it~ portion of thr N:n·aio Tir"rn·ation at an_,. point
dming thr l.'i ~·r:H:-i brtwrrn 1953 and HWS. But although tlrr St:rtr
did p:r ~~ narrow lrgi~lation plll'port ing to rrquirr the cnfon·rmrnt of
air and watrr pollution ~tandnnl~ within rr~rl'\·at ion~. ~rr 3fi Ari7..
Rr1·. Rtat. (Cnm. Snpp.) § lROl ; :w Ariz. HeY. Stat. (C'nm. Supp.)
~ 1R6.'i, it c!Prlined to n~~nmr fnll rrspon~ibilitY for the 1ndi<ll1~ during
thr prriod whrn it had thr opportunit~· to do ~o.

J
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appellee's brief, at 24-26.'s But the appellee nowhere
explains how, without such jurisdiction, the State's tax
may either be imposed or collected. Cf. Transcript of
oral argument, at 38-39. Unless the State is willing to
defend the position that it may constitutionally admillistrr its tax system altogther without judicial intervention, cf. Ward v. Love, 253 U. S. 17 (1920), the admitted absence of either civil or criminal jurisdiction
would seem to dispose of the case.
IV
\Vhen Arizona's contentions are measured against these
statutory imperatives, they a.re simply untenable. The
State relics primarily upon language in Williams v. Lee
stating that the test for determining the validity of state
action is "whether [it] infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
thenL" 358 U. S., at 220. Since Arizona has attempted
to tax individual Indians and not the tribe or reservation as such, it argues that it has not infringed on Indian
rights of self-government.
In fact, we are far from convinced that when a State
imposes taxes upon reservation members without their
consent, its action can be reconciled with tribal selfdetermination. But even if the State's premise is accepted, we reject the suggestion that the Williams test
was meant to apply in this situation. It must be remembered that Williams, and the cases following it, have all
dealt either with non-Indians or with activity outside
the reservation. In these situations, both the Tribe and
the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their
respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed
to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could
'"In light of our prior rnsrs, npprllrc hn~ no choice but to mnke
this concc~~ion. Sec, e. g., Kennerly v. District Court, supra; United
8tates , .. Kasama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886).
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protect its interests up to the point where tr.ibal selfgovernment would be affected.
The problem posed by this case is completely different.
Since appellant is an Indian and since her income is
derived wholly from reservation sources. her activity is
totally within the sphere which the relevant treaties and
statutes leave for the Federal Government and for the
Indians themselves. Appellee cites us to no cases holding that this legislation may be ignored simply because
tribal self-government has not been infringed.tn On the
contrary, this Court expressly rejected such a position
only two years a.go. 2 " In Kennerly v. District Court,
400 U. S. 423 (1971), the Blackfeet Indian Tribe had
voted to make state jurisdiction concurrent within the
reservation. Although the State had not complied with
the procedural prerequisites for the assumption of jurisdiction, it argued that it was nonetheless entitled to extend
its laws to the reservation since such action was obviously
consistent with the wishes of the Tribe and, therefore,
with tribal self-government. But we held that the Williams rule was inapplicable and that "the unilateral action
of the Tribal Council was insufficient to vest Montana
with jurisdiction." 400 U. S., at 427. If Montana may
not assume jurisdiction over the Blackfeet by simple
legislation even when the Tribe itself agrees to be bound
by state law, it surely follows that Ariwna may not
assume such jurisdiction in the absence of tribal
agreement.
01'ganized Village of K.ake v. Egan, 369 U. S. GO (1962) iH not.
such a case. See n. 15, supra.
""Indeed, tho position was expres~ly rejrctrd in Williams, itself,
1.1pon which appellee so heavily relics. Williams hold that "absent
governing Acts of Cong1'ess, tho question has always born whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indian8 to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." 358 U. S., at. 2~0
(emphasis added).
1 :>

.

'
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Nor is the State's attempted distinction between taxes
ou land and on income availing. Indeed, it is somewhat
surprising that the State adheres to this distinction in
light of our decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Ta.1: Commission, supra, wherein we invalidated an
·income tax which Arizona had attempted to impose
within the Navajo Reservation. The land-income distinction may have some bearing on the validity of a
ta.x resisted a.s an illegal levy on a federal instrumentality.
Compare Childers v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 555 (1926), with
Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 297 U. S. 420
(1936). See generally Oklahoma Tax Com:mission v.
United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943). But the distinction
is plainly irrelevant when the tax is resisted because the
State is totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the people and the lands which it seeks to tax.
Finally. we cannot accept the notion that it is irrelevant
"whether the ... ~frmges on [appellant's] right as an individ~al Navajo Indian," as the
State Court ' of Appeals maintained. McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Com.mission, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 454,
484 P. 2d 221, 223 (1970). To be sure, when Congress
has legislated on Indian matters, it has, most often, dealt
with the tribes as collective entities. But those entities
are, after all, composed of individual Indians, and the legislation confers iudividual rights. This Court has therefore held that "the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
Williams v. Lee, supra, at 220. In this case, appellant's
rights as a reservation Indian were violated when the
state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction
to impose. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below must be
Reversed.
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